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RELIGION AND THE LAW  
  
Constitutional secularism: then, now and the future  
  
Tony Meacham1  
  
Introduction: what is secularism?  
  
The word ‘secularism’ in a constitutional context has many understandings by the 
state.  As Dieter Grimm explains:2  
  
‘‘There is a militant secularism that denies religious beliefs any public role 
and insists on their belonging strictly to the private sphere. There is also a 
secularism that separates church and state: the state accepts the role religion 
plays in society, but is prohibited from promoting religious activities or 
giving material or immaterial subsidies to religious communities. There is 
finally a type of secularism that recognizes religion as an elementary human 
urge that seeks public expression, an urge that the state not only has to respect, 
but also must protect and maybe even promote - altogether the opposite of a 
secular fundamentalism.’’  
  
Particularly over the last half century, supreme courts in various jurisdictions have 
examined what their secular paradigms have meant in practice when examining the 
state’s treatment of intersections between the state and religion in the public square.  
That period has given scholars an opportunity to look back and consider what trends 
have come out of those court decisions, and what public policy should be from now 
and reflect on what has been learned.    
  
This article will consider four issues. The first will examine the views of those who, 
with the benefit of hindsight, have analysed secular constitutional states that have 
been secular for a significant period and consider that the purpose for which the state 
has been made secular has failed, and a revised model is needed. The second will 
consider the views that secular constitutions and liberal democracies have evolved to 
adapt to modern challenges and remains as a result an effective model of governance. 
The third part of this paper will look at how secularism may be improved, and perhaps 
be changed to address the critics’ perceptions of irrelevancy. The last will look at 
issues that arise when the state becomes overzealous in its perception of how secular 
the state ought to be, particularly when the perceived paradigm is a strict separation 
of religion and state.  
  
Contemporary secularism: did Holyoake’s vision simply evolve into a new form?  
  
                                                 
1 LLB (Macq) LLM (UNE), PhD (USQ); Lecturer in Law, Coventry University.    
2 Dieter Grimm, ‘Conflicts between general laws and religious norms’, in Susanna Mancini and Michel 
Rosenfeld (eds.) Constitutional Secularism in an Age of Religious Revival (2014, Oxford University 
Press), 6.   
Modern secularism, at least in the Western sense, is usually attributed to George  
Jacob Holyoake68 after his use of the term first in his 1871 book The Principles of 
Secularism Illustrated,34 and in other writings.5   Towards the end of his life,  
Holyoake published his memoirs, aptly titled Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life.  In it, 
he put his last word on what he felt secularism to be.  He said that6   
  
‘‘My argument was that a man could judge a house as to its suitability of 
situation, structure, surroundings, and general desirableness, without ever 
knowing who was the architect or landlord; and if as occupant he received 
no application for rent, he ought in gratitude to keep the place in good repair.  
So it is with this world.  It is our dwelling place. We know the laws of 
sanitation, economy, and equity, upon which health, wealth, and security 
depend. All these things are quite independent of any knowledge of the 
origin of the universe or the owner of it.  And as no demands are made upon 
us in consideration of our tenancy, the least we can do is to improve the estate 
as our acknowledgement of the advantage we enjoy. This is Secularism.’’  
  
The meaning of secularism has almost as many meanings as those whom one might 
ask for it.   Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India,72 once became 
particularly frustrated with the use and abuse of the term ‘Secularism’:7   
  
‘‘Another word is thrown up a good deal, this secular state business. May I 
beg with all humility those gentlemen who use this word often to consult 
some dictionary before they use it?’’  
  
Not much has changed since. Indeed, as the concept has travelled, its meaning has 
varied.  As Bankim Chandra Chatterji noted in the nineteenth century, “You can 
translate a word by a word, but behind the word is an idea, the thing which the word 
denotes, and this idea you cannot translate if it does not exist among the people in 
whose language you are translating.”8   
  
So, where does the understanding of secularism currently stand, and is it still 
consistent with Holyoake’s principles?  In considering where secularism fits in the 
modern world, Robert Audi observed that “[t]he history of the Western world has 
progressed from a time when the state was taken to represent the church to an age in 
which most governments are committed to at least some degree of secularity.”9    
                                                 
3 See T.N. Madan, ‘Secularism in Its Place’, (1987) 46 Journal of Asian Studies 747 and Nehaluddin 
Ahmad, ‘The Modern Concept of Secularism and Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis’, 
(2009) 15(1) Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 75.   
4 George Jacob Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (London Book Store, London, 1871).   
5 George Jacob Holyoake, Origin and Nature of Secularism (London: Watts & Co, 1896), 50.   
6 George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life (T. Fisher Unwin, 1896),294 
72 15 August 1947 – 27 May 1964.  
7 Report 1967:401 Constituent assembly debates official reports, Vol. II.    
8 Quoted in T. N. Madan, ‘Secularism in its Place’, in Rajeev Bhargava (ed), Secularism and its Critics 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 308.  
9 Robert Audi, ‘Religion, Politics and the Secular State’ (2014) 64 (1) The Philosopher’s Magazine 73, 
73.  
Trying to determine what secularism means to the world today is like Segal's law.10 
Look to one jurisdiction for definition, there is usually some consensus.  Look at 
others and the answers are all different.  Maclure and Taylor see it in broad terms as 
the management of moral and religious diversity in contemporary society.  That 
diversity they note includes issues such as Sharia in family law and polygamous 
marriages in Canada, headscarves in France and Hindu nationalists in India. They see 
however that secularism is an essential part of any liberal democracy that adheres “to 
a plurality of conceptions of the world and of the good …”11    Graeme Smith sees 
contemporary secularism as “the latest expression of the Christian 
religion…secularism is Christian ethics shorn of its doctrine. It is the ongoing 
commitment to do good, understood in traditional Christian terms, without a concern 
for the technicalities of the teachings of the Church.”12    
  
Secularism, however, has also touched the Eastern world, but has been adapted for 
local use.  Priya Kumar explains that, in the Indian context, secularism has “expanded 
from its traditional concern with emancipation from religion or the privatization of 
religion to a far more wide-ranging and heterogeneous agenda in postcolonial India. 
It has been called upon to resolve a number of thorny social and political issues, 
including primarily (but not only) the possibility of multi-religious and multicultural 
coexistence within the nation and the complex question of the place of religious 
minorities in a liberal democratic state.”13 Unlike many constitutions, in India one 
cannot just point at one provision in which secularism is enshrined.  In response to a 
suggestion to remove the word from the preamble of India’s constitution, Suhrith 
Parthasarathy explains that “Our Constitution doesn’t acquire its secular character 
merely from the words in the Preamble, but from a collective reading of many of its 
provisions, particularly the various fundamental rights that it guarantees.”14  
  
Many jurisdictions indeed have some degree of secularity, but more importantly, 
usually a different secularity, different often from their neighbours or their colonial 
predecessors.  On this Madhu Purnima Kishwar asked recently,15 “Do we want to 
create a world in which everyone thinks alike? A world in which there is no space 
for divergence of views or foolish people?” Kishwar wrote in the context of a Hindu 
Temple insisting on the religious freedom to determine who may enter a temple. She 
observed that translating an originally European concept into one that jurisdictions 
elsewhere can take on board as their own has proven to be difficult, but not 
impossible.  However, the point she makes is that an overzealous ‘secularism’ carries 
                                                 
10 An old saying that states: "A man with a watch knows what time it is. A man with two watches is 
never sure.”  (Arthur Bloch, Murphy’s Law (Perigee, New York, 2003)).  
11 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (trans. Jane Marie Todd) Secularism and Freedom of 
Conscience (Harvard University Press, 2011), 1.  
12 Graeme Smith, Short History of Secularism (I.B.Taurus, London, 2007), 2.  
13 Priya Kumar, Limiting Secularism (University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 1.  
14 Suhrith Parthasarathy, ‘Understanding secularism in the Indian context’, The Hindu, January 2, 2018. 
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-secular-condition/article22347527.ece.  
15 “Don’t like this temple?  Choose another.” The Hindu, January 17, 2013.  
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/dont-like-this-temple-choose-another/article4313507.ece  .  
with it intolerance for the unconventional and often an element of hypocrisy.16 On 
this latter point I expand further in part IV of this paper.     
  
Holyoake did not envision secularism to be a tool to be used by individuals, 
organisations or the state bluntly against those who dissent against orthodoxy. Rather, 
it was intended as a means for all participants in the public sphere to have their place. 
In particular it was not intended to be a political panacea for all ills nor an alternative 
orthodoxy used to supplant another. Holyoake spent much of his time related to 
Secularism defending it against accusations of hostility to religion in the public 
sphere, and in general.  Accordingly, most of his speeches and writings are less 
polemical on his thoughts and more efforts to get across the idea that secularism is 
not anti-religious, or indeed seeking to limit religion.  The thrust of his views is that 
secularism gives equal access to all players in the public sphere, but not all need equal 
access, and some may play a greater role in contributing to public policy, or none. A 
constitution is a mirror of a society and its values, and many such as those in this 
paper are looking to see if the values stand, or perhaps need tweaking.  More than 
ever, when they discuss secularism, as seen in the views of the commentators 
considered, they go back to where their secular values originated, and many 
acknowledge the work and thoughts of George Holyoake as a man who could offer 
an alternative to the state or religion wresting control of the public space.   
  
The oft-cited crisis of secularism: did Holyoake’s vision fail?  
  
There are often statements in academic writings, and even newspapers, suggesting 
that secularism has failed,17 religiosity is on the ascendant,18 and that we should all 
acknowledge that secularism had a good try at changing the world, but we must now 
accept that that model must now be discarded.1920 One such critic, William Connolly, 
has stated that “[t]he historical modus vivendi called secularism is coming apart at 
the seams.”21  Lorenzo Zucca agrees and says that “[t]he secular state is in a difficult 
position.  It barely copes with diversity and the fact of pluralism.”87   He sees the role 
of the secular state as the management of diversity, ergo the more diverse it becomes 
the more unmanageable it is.  Accordingly, he sees “the impossibility of satisfying 
                                                 
16 “Don’t like this temple?  Choose another.” The Hindu, January 17, 2013. 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/dont-like-this-temple-choose-another/article4313507.ece   
17 Bruce Ledewitz, Church, State and the Crisis in American Secularism (Indiana University Press, 
2011), 171.  
18 “The world we contemplate at the dawning of the twentieth-first century remains vibrantly, 
energetically, even at times maniacally religious, in ways large and small, good and bad, superficial 
and profound, now as much as ever”. (Wilfred M. McClay, ‘Two Concepts of Secularism’, (2001) 
13(1) Journal of Policy History 47, 48; Christian Joppke, The secular state under siege: Religion and 
politics in Europe and America (Polity Press, 2015).  
19 Jakob de Roover, Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,  
20 ), 3; Bhanu Dhamija, ‘Junk today’s secularism: India needs a reinvented secularism 2.0 rooted in 
separation of religion and state’, The Times of India (8 August, 2017); see generally H. Baker, The 
End of Secularism (Crossway, 2009).  
21 William E. Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 19. 87 
Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional 
Landscape (Oxford University Press, 2012), 30.  
[the demands of religion] only increases the gap between different segments of 
society, which is thus more and more polarised.” 22  
  
Tariq Modood23 cited publications in this vein in the context of European secularism 
such as those by Olivier Roy, “The Crisis of the Secular State,”24 and Rajeev 
Bhargava writing on the “crisis of secular states in Europe.”25  Modood felt that the 
stream of such articles intimating such a crisis in Secularism is misleading.  He notes 
that in Europe that it is more a challenge for political secularism or multiculturalism 
to adjust to post-immigration multiculturalism, to adjust to significant numbers of 
migrants who challenge the status quo of residual privilege to the majority religion, 
such as tax concessions and grants, or simply a voice recognised and respected in the 
public sphere.  His view of secularism is that it comes in two forms: the first is that 
exemplified by French Laïcité, and the other what he terms “organized religion as a 
potential public good or national resource (not just a private benefit)”.26  Rajeev  
Bhargava, in his response article to Modood, tended to agree, arguing that “we need 
not an alternative to but an alternative conception of secularism, one that is different 
from mainstream conceptions shaped by French Laïcité and the American wall of 
separation variant.” 27  He sees that contemporary secularism is inflexible, as are the 
politics and law associated with it.  Moderate, or accommodative, secularism in his 
view is not succeeding.  Bhargava sees a future for secularism in Europe only “[o]nce 
we have shifted away from these and start to focus on the normative, informal 
practices of a broader range of Western and non-Western states, we shall see that 
better forms of secular states and much more defensible versions of secularisms are  
available.” 28     
  
Adding to the distrust of secularism by some, on occasions there has been a conflation 
of the term “secularization” with “secularism”.29 The arguments made by such 
                                                 
22 Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape 
(Oxford University Press, 2012), 30.  
23 Tariq Modood, ‘Is there a crisis of secularism in Western Europe?’, The Immanent Frame: 
Secularism, Religion and the Public Sphere, 24 August 2011.  
<http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/08/24/isthere-a-crisis-of-secularism-in-western-europe/ >.  
24 In Olivier Roy, Secularism confronts Islam, Columbia University Press (2007).  
25 In Rajeev Bhargava, ‘States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism’, (2010) 12(3) The 
Hedgehog Review 8.  
26 Tariq Modood, ‘Is there a crisis of secularism in Western Europe?’, The Immanent Frame: 
Secularism, Religion and the Public Sphere, 24 August 2011.  
<http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/08/24/isthere-a-crisis-of-secularism-in-western-europe/ >.  
27 Rajeev Bhargava, “Beyond moderate secularism”, The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion and 
the Public Sphere, 16 September 2011. <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/16/beyond-
moderatesecularism/.>  
28 Rajeev Bhargava, “Beyond moderate secularism”, The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion and 
the Public Sphere, 16 September 2011. <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/16/beyond-
moderatesecularism/.>  
29 A popular anti-secular stance is propounded by Jean Bethke Elshtain who, associating secularism 
with anti-religious views, explains: “During the past few years, we have been treated to a spate of 
work blaming religion for every evil under the sun while conveniently ignoring that the greatest 
horrors of the twentieth century—the bloodiest of all centuries—were fueled by two antireligious 
totalitarian regimes,  
Nazi Germany and the officially atheistic Soviet empire.”  (Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Religion and  
individuals have therefore muddied the waters of discourse in this area and inflamed 
the views of those who see the first and create antipathy for the second.  One such is 
Jean Bethke Elshtain who argues that the “secularization hypothesis has failed, and 
failed spectacularly. We must now find a new paradigm that will help us to 
understand the complexities of the relationship between religion and democracy.”30  
Another is T.N. Madan, whose writings are very assertively against secularism as a 
model of democratic government and sees secularism as a Western concept imposing 
colonial values inappropriate for the Indian context.31 He does however admit that he 
is  
“bedevilled by terminological confusion, ethnographic diversity and ideological  
dissension.” 32     
  
Madan illustrates his position with the views of the sociologist David Martin.  He 
notes Martin’s dissatisfaction with secularization in general, with what is believed to 
have a “counter religious impulse”.33  Madan argues that:  
  
‘‘Conservatives see secularization as a threat to their conceptions of the good, 
moral, life, robbing it of its ideas of sacredness and ultimate value, the 
secularists look upon it as an anti-religious emancipator process. The latter 
consider urbanization, industrialization and modernization as the causes and 
symptoms of the ‘secularizing fever’ that grips our societies today.’’  
  
Arguments such as Madan’s are typical of commentators34 who tend to see the 
process of secularization as an active process promoted and propelled by ‘secularists’ 
characterised as ‘the other’ to be opposed and countered by those who disagree with 
it. He does not define ‘secularists’ as any particular group, but they appear to be 
personified and identified with the secularization process. They and secularism are 
therefore seen as being aligned as a counter societal process without respect for local 
and traditional processes and practices.    
Madan’s conflation is articulated in a discussion on George Jacob Holyoake who 
“inherited from the Owenite and Utilitarian movements of England a naturalistic, 
ethical and social utopian rationalism.  From the French Revolution he derived 
republicanism, anticlericalism and an aversion to theology.”35  From this reasoning, 
Madan considers secularism to be “an anti-religious ideology” and indeed almost 
conflates it with the notion of a civil religion when he argues that:  
  
‘‘Secularism as the state ideology of India seeks to provide the moral basis of 
public life just as Islam supposedly does in Pakistan; the state in India is 
                                                 
Democracy’, (2009) 20(2) Journal of Democracy 5, 8.)  
30 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Religion and Democracy’, (2009) 20(2) Journal of Democracy 5, 8.  
31 T.N. Madan, ‘Whither Indian Secularism?’ (1993) 27(3) Modern Asian Studies 667, 668-9.  
32 T.N. Madan, ‘Whither Indian Secularism?’ (1993) 27(3) Modern Asian Studies 667, 668.  
33 Citing David Martin, ‘Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization’ in J. Gould (ed.), Penguin 
Survey of the Social Sciences (Penguin, 1965).  
34 Such as Partha Chatterjee and Ashis Nandy.  
35 T.N. Madan, ‘Whither Indian Secularism?’ (1993) 27(3) Modern Asian Studies 667, 670.  
expected to protect and promote secularism in more or less the same manner 
in which the Sri Lankan state is expected to protect and promote Buddhism.’’  
  
This promotion of secularism as a state religion that must be pushed and defended by 
the state as if it were a religious establishment is a concerning argument.  It appeals 
to those who think in terms of formal religion and its ‘opponents’ and couches the 
argument in terms of an ideology that must be displaced as soon as those who 
advocate it may be identified and removed. Secularism as advocated by Holyoake 
was no such thing.  His secularism did not offer an alternative moral fabric for society 
nor did Holyoake seek to replace religious traditions with another as some form of 
established ‘religion’.  However, such arguments by such as Madan and Nandy, 
couched in those terms, allow secularism to be perceived as the enemy of tradition 
and religion, to be a modernity to be denied.  
  
Secularism is more often now being widely seen as being in strife.  Samuel F.  
Huntington said in 1998 that:36   
  
‘‘The increasing political power of religious fundamentalists is not confined 
to the Middle East.  Rather, it is a virtually worldwide phenomenon. … 
Throughout the World, religious identities are increasing.  The power and 
salience of religion has increased.  There is more questioning of the secular 
state.  This could be called secularism or the revenge of God…Since the 
collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, the identities of many 
nations have been increasingly based on religion, with governments using 
faith to define their legitimacy.  …  The rise of religious consciousness has 
generated an increase of conflict based on religion and on persecution.’’  
  
Historically, moderate secular thought as proposed by Holyoake has been 
consistently criticised as being associated with atheism, or those who are anti-
religious.  This has naturally engendered a feeling of persecution by those who 
therefore see secularism as harmful to the religious institutions to which they hold 
allegiance. Like the squeaky wheel that makes the most noise, the ‘hard’ secular 
paradigms of the US and France have been those that have received the greatest 
attention, and have been seen as the face of modern secularism.  A cursory look at 
the breadth of scholarship on secularism will show that most of the writings on this 
topic have related to controversies in respect of these two states.  Those states which 
have secular principles consistent with Holyoake, such as Australia, Canada and 
much of Europe, have had few debates on this issue.  Without the hard edges to rub 
against, there have been few sparks. Those who feel that secularism is a faulty 
paradigm have been saying so for some time, and most not recently.  It will be 
instructive now to consider the current state of secular government in liberal 
democracies.  
  
Future secularism: a need for more than tolerance  
  
                                                 
36 Samuel F Huntington, “The Revenge of God: Secularism Retreats” The Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs, May-June1998, 68.  
A modern definition of secularism cannot be made in terms of what secularism is not.  
Rather, we should move forward.  Some such as Simone Chambers see that we are 
already doing so.37  
Much of the jurisprudence relating to secularism has accepted a domestic norm of 
mainstream conceptions such as that found in France or the United States, and has 
not explored what secularism could be, and is slow to consider alternatives.  
Secularism in the modern world is now a much more complicated concept.  Most 
liberal democracies have a secular state peculiarly their own. In times past Secularism 
in  
Europe was a simple distinction between the state and a religion, the latter common 
to most if not all of the citizens of the state.  Now, the religion that attempts to share 
the public sphere with the state is not one but many, so now religion is now also 
seeking identity, to have its unique voice heard and respected distinct from the others.  
The public sphere is now much more complex, an increasingly pluralistic polity, 
shared now not only with the religious, but now also with the actively non-religious 
and even the anti-religious.  It may or may not be in crisis, but it needs a review.  
  
There are views varying from secularism being the only solution to a divided modern 
world, to secularism being liberalism gone amok and likely to tear modern society 
apart.  The philosopher John Rawls38 in his book Political Liberalism expounded his 
ideal of public reason in which “citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions 
within the framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based 
on values that others can reasonably be expected to endorse”.  These latter views 
have caused some controversy,39 together with the similar views of others such as 
Kent Greenawalt and Robert Audi.  Greenawalt40 for example considers that religious 
arguments are acceptable in supporting political positions whenever secular 
arguments cannot resolve issues, such as abortion and animal rights issues.  Audi41 
argues that religious convictions should largely or completely be excluded from 
politics.  Jürgen Habermas has asked in respect of Rawls views regarding public 
reason:  
  
‘‘How does the constitutional separation of state and church influence the role 
which religious traditions, communities and organizations are allowed to play 
in civil society and the political public sphere, above all in the political 
opinion and will formation of citizens themselves? Where should the dividing 
                                                 
37 “I see a growing number of open secularists and liberal theists converging on a centre position. The 
core ... is an invitation to all religious citizens, indeed all citizens, complete with their deepest 
convictions, to participate in public life and debate within certain liberal/moral constraints governing 
appropriateness of public justifications.” (Simone Chambers, ‘Secularism Minus Exclusion: 
Developing a Religious–Friendly Idea of Public Reason’ (2010) 19(2) The Good Society 16, 16.  
38 James P. Sterba, ‘Rawls and Religion’ in Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (Eds.), The Idea of 
Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (2000), 34.  
39 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, (2006) 14(1) European Journal of Philosophy 1, 
3.  
40 Kent Greenawalt, ‘Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts’ (1990) 38 
DePaul Law Review 1019, 1022.    
41 Robert Audi, ‘The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society’ (1993) 30 San 
Diego Law Review 677.  
line be in the opinion of the revisionists? Are the opponents who are currently 
out on the warpath against the liberal standard version of an ethics of 
citizenship actually only championing the pro-religious meaning of a secular 
state held to be neutral, versus a narrow secularist notion of a pluralist 
society? Or are they more or less inconspicuously changing the liberal agenda 
from the bottom up—and thus already arguing from the background of a 
different selfunderstanding of Modernity?’’  
  
Habermas explains Rawls’ public reason argument as “‘natural’ reason, in other 
words solely on public arguments to which supposedly all persons have equal access. 
The assumption of a common human reason forms the basis of justification for a 
secular state that no longer depends on religious legitimation. And this in turn makes 
the separation of state and church possible at the institutional level in the first place.” 
He feels that constitutional religious freedom is the solution to religious pluralism.42   
So, what must be done with secularism to make it less contentious and palatable to 
as many as possible? William Connolly argues that “I certainly do not suggest that a 
common religion needs to be reinstated in public life or that separation of church and 
state in some sense of that phrase needs to be reversed. Such attempts would intensify 
cultural wars already in motion.  Secularism needs refashioning, not elimination”.43 
Michael Rosenfeld feels that the public sphere must be shrunk to a minimum so as 
best to “achieve objectives over which there is unanimous consensus throughout the 
polity.”110  The difficulty with Rosenfeld’s view is that in order to find a public square 
small enough to find a space where all players agree, that space is likely to be 
miniscule or non-existent.  It is impossible to find a space where so many diverse 
interests may contribute, and still make those contributions meaningful.  The answer 
is likely to be that the public square is no smaller, and accessible to all, but that all 
players must accept that they must make concessions, find common ground and work 
with what they have.  Also, he discusses variants within each broad model such as 
France and Turkey, but does not consider any concept of secularism that may have 
taken seed elsewhere, particularly in jurisdictions where the constitution is secular 
but the majority of the population is non-European.44    
  
Regarding models outlining the relations between the state and religion, Charles 
Taylor45 argues that:  
‘‘[o]ne of our basic difficulties in dealing with these problems is that we have 
the wrong model, which has a continuing hold on our minds. We think that 
secularism (or laïcité) has to do with the relation of the state and religion, 
whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state 
to diversity. … There is no reason to single out religious (as against 
                                                 
42 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006) 14(1) European Journal of Philosophy 1, 
4.  
43 William E. Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 19. 
110 Michael Rosenfeld, Law, Justice, Democracy and the Clash of Cultures: A Pluralist 
Account (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 158.  
44 Michael Rosenfeld, Law, Justice, Democracy and the Clash of Cultures: A Pluralist Account 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), 155.  
45 Charles Taylor, ‘The Meaning of Secularism’ The Hedgehog Review (Vol. 12 no. 3, 2010) 23, 25.  
nonreligious), “secular” (in another widely used sense), or atheist viewpoints. 
Indeed, the point of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favoring or 
disfavoring not just religious positions, but any basic position, religious or 
nonreligious. We can’t favor Christianity over Islam, but also we can’t favor 
religion over against nonbelief in religion, or vice versa.  
The late-Rawlsian formulation for a secular state cleaves very strongly to 
certain political principles: human rights, equality, the rule of law, 
democracy. These are the very basis of the state, which must support them. 
But this political ethic can be and is shared by people of very different basic 
outlooks (what Rawls calls “comprehensive views of the good”). A Kantian 
will justify the rights to life and freedom by pointing to the dignity of rational 
agency; a Utilitarian will speak of the necessity to treat beings who can 
experience joy and suffering in such a way as to maximize the first and 
minimize the second.’’  
  
In a case relating to same-sex marriage, the South African Constitutional Court in 
their judgment, made a clear statement of the place for all non-majoritarian positions 
in the public sphere.  Views need not be merely tolerated, but rather should be valued 
as equal parts of the polity:  
  
‘‘As was said by this Court in Christian Education46 there are a number of 
constitutional provisions that underline the constitutional value of 
acknowledging diversity and pluralism in our society.  … Taken together, 
they affirm the right of people to self-expression without being forced to 
subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others, and 
highlight the importance of individuals and communities being able to enjoy 
what has been called the “right to be different”.  In each case, space has been 
found for members of communities to depart from a majoritarian norm.  The 
point was made in Christian Education that these provisions collectively and 
separately acknowledge the rich tapestry constituted by civil society, 
indicating in particular that language, culture and religion constitute a strong 
weave in the overall pattern.  …  The strength of the nation envisaged by the 
Constitution comes from its capacity to embrace all its members with dignity 
and respect.’’47  
  
Similarly the Supreme Court of Canada has held in Chamberlain v Surrey School 
District No. 3648 that:  
‘‘In my view, Saunders J. [the trial judge] below erred in her assumption that 
“secular” effectively meant “non-religious”.  This is incorrect since nothing 
in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper understanding of 
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pluralism demands that atheistically based moral positions trump religiously 
based moral positions on matters of public policy.  … To construe the  
“secular” as the realm of the “unbelief” is therefore erroneous.  Given this, 
why, then, should the religiously informed conscience be placed at a public 
disadvantage or disqualification?  To do so would be to distort liberal 
principles in an illiberal fashion and would provide only a feeble notion of 
pluralism.  The key is that people will disagree about important issues, and 
such disagreement, where it does not imperil community living, must be 
capable of being accommodated at the core of a modern pluralism.’’49  
  
The Court in Chamberlain v Surrey made clear that the public sphere in a secular 
democracy must not be deemed to exclude religion, and must include opinions based 
in religion as well as those based in other considerations.50    
Considering the issue from an opposing perspective, the Indian anti-secularist Ashis 
Nandy said that:  
  
‘‘It is time to recognize that, instead of trying to build religious tolerance on 
the good faith or the conscience of a small group of de-ethnicized, 
middleclass politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, a far more serious 
venture would be to explore the philosophy, the symbolism, and the theology 
of tolerance in the faiths of the citizens and hope that the state systems in 
South Asia may learn something about religious tolerance from everyday 
Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, or Sikhism rather than wish that ordinary 
Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs will learn tolerance from the various 
fashionable secular theories of statecraft.’’  
  
John Gray, the author of The Two Faces of Liberalism, contends that   
  
‘‘The liberal view of toleration contains an internal contradiction: on the one 
hand, liberalism tries to reach a rational consensus on the best way of life; yet 
on the other hand, liberalism believes that human beings can flourish through 
many different ways of life.’’118  
  
Gray considers that the current view of toleration is internally contradictory as it tries 
to achieve a consensus on the best way to live, yet believes that people will flourish 
through many ways of life.  He contends that the homogeneity of contemporary 
society means that a consensus on values impossible.    
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In the US in recent years the efforts of secular governments no longer to 
accommodate strong religious positions in public policy is being seen not as a neutral 
position of government, but rather a battle between religion and secular government 
for the public sphere, sometimes titled a ‘culture war’.  The late US Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia said that the Court “has taken sides in the culture war”,119 the 
Kulturkampf as the Germans have styled it.  The debate, the culture war, continues 
nonetheless in contemporary US society.    
  
Michael Hernandez maintains that contemporary law and government in the US are 
currently still affected by religious principles in the form of “civil religion”, which 
while he argues is “not grounded in the tenets of any particular faith” is then not 
sectarian, but is clearly Christian in nature. He cites Alexis de Toqueville in 1835 
saying “[t]here is no country in the whole world in which the Christian religion 
retains a greater influence over the souls of men than in America …”, and notes how 
far the court in is removed from the early Christian era in rejecting Judeo-Christian 
principles  
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in its interpretations, but is himself of the view that Christianity is losing its influence 
on the development of contemporary American law. 51    
  
Then again, Jeremy Rabkin is more pragmatic, commenting on the so-called culture 
war:  
  
‘‘Having agitated and distracted our politics for more than a quarter of a 
century ... it still shows no signs of slackening.  It continues to rattle, like 
some Victorian ghost, haunting most of all those robed judicial worthies who 
are most intent on laying it to rest.’’52  
  
The reasons for so many perceptions on modern secular governance and secularism’s 
future have many bases.  Maclure and Taylor122 put it down to “the relationship 
between religious and nonreligious people [being] often characterized by 
incomprehension, distrust, and sometimes even mutual intolerance.”  They see that 
modern atheists and agnostics have difficulty in understanding individuals whose 
truth cannot be evaluated with the scientific approach.  The religious cannot 
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understand why the non-religious cannot move beyond the material.  Their solution 
is that “contemporary societies must develop the ethical and political knowledge that 
will allow them to fairly and consistently manage the moral, spiritual, and cultural 
diversity at their heart.”53    
  
The downside when a state is too secular: non-neutral neutrality  
  
Utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill advocated social change 
and the removal of harm such that society altogether gained.  George Holyoake, 
building on their work, had advocated that secularism intended that society should 
find a role for both religion and the state in the public sphere.    
  
If one considers that secularism is a neutrality of the state towards religion, can the 
wish of the state to appear neutral actually be counterproductive to secular ideals?  
There are some strong views on how secular a state need be in order to effectively 
meet the obligations of the state to the people and of religion to contribute to public 
discourse in matters that are of importance to it.  Veit Bader54 has observed in the US 
context that:  
  
‘‘Most American liberal philosophers, among them Dworkin, Ackerman, 
Galston, Rawls, Macedo, and Audi, "believe that ... values of freedom, 
equality and toleration are best preserved if religion is removed from public 
affairs." They are virtually unanimous in their staunch advocacy of the "wall 
of separation." They believe that "both religious practice and pluralistic 
democracy are best preserved" by precluding religious argumentation within 
the public realm and by putting "the moral ideals that divide us off the 
conversational agenda of the liberal state.’’  
  
This interpretation of secularism, according to some interpretations, is the complete 
absence of religion in the public sphere, in what is termed in the US ‘strict 
secularism’.  The presumption, as has been explored earlier, is that if the state is not 
seen through actions of its institutions, policies or agents to be favouring religion in 
any way, then the general population will not believe that they are acting contrary to 
the constitutional paradigm that supports this model.    
  
It has been suggested that the apparent strict neutrality of the US Supreme Court is 
actually working contrary to the best interests of religious minorities.  Shivakumar55 
asks the question of whether the strict neutrality practice adds to the power and 
influence of mainstream religions, whilst minimising the rights of religious 
minorities because of their lesser political influence.  In the last thirty years the impact 
of the Supreme Court on the privileged treatment of religion in the public sphere 
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remains profound.  Academic commentators such as Frederick Gedicks56 have since 
argued that religious exemptions cannot be supported because they violate legal 
commitments to equality.  Eisgruber and Sager57 have noted that the only the Free 
Speech element of the First Amendment to the US Constitution should remain 
privileged; religion like race should be protected only from discrimination.  
  
Ultimately, it may be impossible to maintain an objectively neutral stance in such 
cases.  Michael McConnell, recently a circuit judge on the US Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit,128 argues that in some contexts “departures from religious 
neutrality are either permissible or constitutionally required.”  McConnell goes on to 
note that no genuinely neutral governmental approach may be available.58  Gedicks 
has made the interesting observation that “[r]eligious neutrality presupposes that the 
purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to prevent religious discrimination, rather than 
to protect freedom of action in a domain of religious liberty.” Different responses on 
both sides of the Atlantic between the US and France have resulted in a lack of 
understanding of the positions of the other in relation to issues created in the contexts 
of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the treatment of religious minorities. 
This has resulted in what Jeremy Ghez calls an “uneasiness” in political and academic 
circles where the interaction of religious interests with the state are seen as pretexts 
for struggles which “may have far less to do with theology than with political 
governance and values.”  He describes the current French approach to be “means that 
the French society would rather ban all signs of religious faith in public schools for 
instance – including the Islamic veil – and thus limit the extent to which an individual 
can publicly affirm his or her faith, than allow any religious belief to influence a 
political debate.”59    
  
In the UK, Russell Sandberg has characterised these debates in the UK as a tension 
between the old and the new.  The old laws are those that give Christianity and 
Christians a special degree of protection whilst tolerating other religions, where the 
legislature and judiciary had a stance of passive accommodation rather than 
proscriptive regulation.  The new are laws that consider individual rights of religious 
freedom need be balanced against other rights.60 However, there can be a place for 
reasonable accommodation of religion in the public sphere where such 
accommodation aids in public discourse and does not detract from the state’s ideals 
of maintaining communal harmony and community safety and security.  So, what is 
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‘reasonable’?  A series of apt questions was put by Robert Thiemann some years ago 
regarding accommodation of religious precepts in the public sphere:132   
  
‘‘What are the appropriate limits of governmental accommodation of 
majority religious belief and practice within a pluralistic democracy? At what 
point does proper accommodation of religion become improper aid or 
assistance to religion? When does accommodation of the majority religion 
become discriminatory toward religious minorities?’’  
  
This is of course an ongoing debate regarding whether in modern pluralistic societies 
all viewpoints can reasonably be accommodated.  
   
Conclusion  
  
Societies have become more pluralistic over the last half century or more.  States 
are now more accepting of those who bring different views and values, but those 
values need to be added to the pool of experience of existing populations in order to 
create new constitutional identities that are inclusive, rather than the old being 
tolerant of the new.  Holyoake’s principles continue to serve.  Ideals such as the 
accepting all viewpoints in the public sphere, including the religious, and to not 
seek to replace those views with another remain the most popular model for liberal 
democracies in increasingly pluralistic societies. This paper is a two-part study 
exploring the nature of modern constitutional secularism. The discussion in this 
paper illustrates a wide institutional and academic diversity of understanding of 
what constitutional secularism is in modern application, sometimes quite unlike the 
position Holyoake once outlined.    
  
  
On modern secularism Rajeev Bhargava argued that:61   
  
‘‘Western states need to improve the understanding of their own secular 
practices just as Western secularism needs a better theoretical 
selfunderstanding. Rather than get stuck on a model they developed at a 
particular time in their history, they would do well to more carefully 
examine the normative potential in their own political practices.’’  
  
And, more recently,62 that:  
  
‘‘While secularism continues to be a value everywhere in Europe, its 
transgression is not seen as a threat to it because the meaning of secularism 
has not shifted from the one developed in the nineteenth century to another 
more suited to conditions of deep religious diversity.’’  
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In the next edition of this journal I will examine how the courts have interpreted 
nineteenth century ideals to twenty-first century realities.  
  
 
